Authors
Mariana Korsunsky
Director, Boston
mkorsunsky@goulstonstorrs.com+1 617 574 3584
Kevin P. O'Flaherty
Of Counsel, Boston
koflaherty@goulstonstorrs.com+1 617 574 6413
Gary M. Ronan
Director, Boston
gronan@goulstonstorrs.com+1 617 574 3593
Sydney Cramer
Associate, Boston
scramer@goulstonstorrs.com+1 617 574 0504
Joel E. Antwi
Associate, Washington, D.C.
jantwi@goulstonstorrs.com+1 617 574 0585Related Expertise
9 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton, 128 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025)
In 29 Greenwood, the Newton Historical Commission (the “Commission”) issued a permit to 29 Greenwood, LLC (“Greenwood”) for restoration of the Gershom Hyde House, an historic landmark. As Greenwood began restoring the property, it discovered that the house was in worse physical condition than anticipated, and as a result, it tore down portions of the home with plans to rebuild it in its original style. The Commission, however, determined that Greenwood had violated municipal ordinances and revoked the permit. Thereafter, Greenwood submitted a series of revised proposals, each of which was denied.
Greenwood filed suit in state court (the “original state court action”) challenging under state law the Commission’s numerous rejections of its remedial plans. Greenwood then filed a second state court action (the “second state court action”) accusing the Commission of taking its property without just compensation in violation of the U.S. Constitution and state law, on the theory that the Commission would never approve any renovation plan sufficient to make the property usable, and had thus effected a taking of the property. The Commission removed the second state court action to federal court. The federal trial court dismissed Greenwood’s case, ruling that it appeared to be an ordinary zoning dispute between a zoning board and a property owner, rather than an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment Taking and, therefore, was a matter for the state to adjudicate. Greenwood appealed to the First Circuit.
On appeal, in a decision authored by retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer (sitting by designation), the First Circuit held that it was indeed inappropriate for the federal court to hear the merits of Greenwood’s case, but not because it constituted “an ordinary zoning dispute.” Rather, the Court determined that the federal court should stay the case until the state law cases were resolved, reasoning that:
Given the overlapping legal issues between the pending state-court case (concerning state law, not federal constitutional law) and the case here (concerning a federal constitutional issue), the best course is for the state court to analyze this dispute before the federal courts weigh in further . . . [i]f Greenwood loses its case in state court, that means the Commission acted reasonably under state law, suggesting that this is the sort of ordinary zoning dispute not likely to trigger the Takings Clause . . . [a]nd if Greenwood prevails, it should be able to obtain there a significant portion of the relief it seeks here.
As a result, instead of deciding the case on its substantive merits, the First Circuit held that it would not render any decision until the initial state action was resolved because the state-level action could resolve, moot, or substantially narrow a federal constitutional issue.1
29 Greenwood is an important reminder that federal courts likely will take a back seat when a related question is pending before a state court – particularly where the state court’s decision may impact the federal case. Any property owner considering simultaneous legal actions against a municipality in state and federal courts, should carefully consider whether the federal action would be susceptible to the fate of the plaintiff in 29 Greenwood.
1This legal principle is commonly referred to as “Pullman Abstention.” See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)
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